Evolution of Cooperation on Playing Prisoner&#x27;s Dilemma Game in the Finite-Capacity Spot by Hiroshi Toyoizumi
Evolution of Cooperation on Playing Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game in the Finite-Capacity Spot
Hiroshi Toyoizumi1
1Graduate School of Accounting, Waseda University
and Department of Applied Mathematics, Waseda University
Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior has been one of main challenges in evo-
lutionary theory1–6. Cooperation may collapse a surge of defectors who enjoy the benefit
without cooperation in situation called prisoner’s dilemma. In the concept of evolutionary
game theory, there are many proposals to explain the evolution of cooperation by adding
further mechanism such as, kin selection1, reciprocity7, punishment8,9, and the finiteness of
the population6. In evolutionary game theory, a pair is randomly-picked from population,
and play a prisoner’s dilemma game. Here we also show the finiteness encourages cooper-
ation but use different approach: in spite of random-pick, individuals join and leave a spot
or territory with a limited capacity to form a pair and play prisoner’s dilemma game during
their stay in the spot. We use a simple finite-state continuous-time Markov chain to analyze
the dynamics in the spot and find that, given large cooperation benefit, just leaving together
from the spot is enough for cooperation to be emerged. Further, we show that the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors may become stable in highly congested spots.
Suppose that there are cooperators (type C) and defectors (type D) in population. There are
spots where individuals arrive and leave to form a pair, and an individual stays at the spot for a
1
random time duration. For simplicity, we assume a spot allows two individuals at most. In a spot
with two individuals, the third individual cannot enter there and is forced to leave (see Figure 1).
If there is only one individual in the spot, there is no game to play and the individual has to wait
for another individual arriving at the spot. The ratio of cooperators is p in this generation. When
another individual shows up, they start playing a prisoner’s dilemma game with the payoff rate
matrixR as
R =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, (1)
where we assume b > c. A cooperator in a pair altruistically contributes the pair with the cost at
the rate c, and the opponent receive its benefit with the rate b. On the contrary, a defector refuses
to contribute his pair but only receive the benefit selfishly if possible. Thus, for example, if two
cooperators make a pair for a time duration s, then the payoff to each cooperator is (b − c)s. Re-
gardless of whom an individual playing against, defecting the opponent always gives individuals
a greater payoff. The ratio of cooperators in the next generation, p′, is determined by its relative
fitness in the current generation. Since all spots have the same structure and those who do not play
the prisoner’s dilemma game are neutral to the evolution of cooperation, we concentrate on interac-
tions in a marked spot. Let (Nc(t), Nd(t)) be the vector of the number of cooperators and defectors
in the spot at the time t, which has the six states Ω = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (1, 1), (0, 2)}.
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According to (1), the total reward rate for cooperators and defectors in the spot are respectively
denoted by
C(t) = 2(b− c)1{Nc(t),Nd(t))=(2,0)}(t)− c1{Nc(t),Nd(t))=(1,1)}(t),
D(t) = c1{Nc(t),Nd(t))=(1,1)}(t), (2)
where 1A(t) is the indicator function of the set A. The relative total payoff obtained by each type
in the current generation [0, T ] is assumed to set the population mix in the next generation, i.e.,
p′ =
∫ T
0
C(t)dt∫ T
0
C(t)dt +
∫ T
0
D(t)dt
, (3)
and if p′ > p, cooperation evolves. Let pij = P{(Nc(t), Nd(t)) = (i, j)} be the stationary
probability of the population vector in the spot, and let Cn be the payoff of n-th departed cooper-
ator among those who played the game. Using (2) and the time-average approximation, we have
∫ T
0
C(t)dt/T ≈ E[C(t)] = 2(b − c)p20 − cp11 and
∫ T
0
D(t)dt/T ≈ E[D(t)] = bp11. The time
average E[C(t)] and the sample average E[Cn] = limm→∞
∑m
n=1 Cn/m have the relationship
called Little’s formula10–12 E[C(t)] = νpE[Cn] where ν is the departure rate of individual who
played games in the spot. Thus, it is easy to see the evolution condition p′ > p is equivalent to the
inequality:
2(b− c)p20 − cp11
νp
=
E[C(t)]
νp
= E[Cn] > E[Dn] =
E[D(t)]
(1− p)ν =
bp11
(1− p)ν . (4)
Here we adopt simple Markovian assumptions, to estimate the steady state probabilities p20 and
p11, and to see if cooperation evolves or not. Suppose the arrival of individuals to the spot is
Poisson process with the rate λ, and the sojourn times are independent and identically distributed
as the exponential distribution with its mean 1/μ. The population dynamics (Nc(t), Nd(t)) can
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be modeled by a 6-state continuous-time Markov chain on Ω (see the state transition diagram in
Figure 2). Let π = (p00, p10, p01, p20, p11, p02) be the stationary probability vector and Q be the
transition rate matrix where
Q =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−λ pλ (1− λ)λ 0 0 0
μ −μ− λ 0 pλ (1− λ)λ 0
0 0 0 0 pλ (1− λ)λ
2μ 0 0 −2μ 0 0
0 μ μ 0 −2μ 0
0 0 2μ 0 0 −2μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (5)
The steady state probability vector π can be obtained by solving the stationary state equation:
πQ = 0, (6)
along with the additional total probability condition: p00 + p10 + p01 + p20 + p11 + p02 = 1.
If we ignore the individual types in the spot, this is the queueing system called an M/M/s/s
queue (with s = 2 in this case). The M/M/s/s queue, or the queue with Poisson (Memoryless)
arrival, exponential (Memoryless) service times and s server where only s individuals allowed in
the system, has been intensively studied in queueing literatures and applied to the sizing problem
of telephone circuits13. Queueing theory is a great tool to understand stochastic phenomena but
is applied to biological behavior problems in very limited number of papers10,14. Since, with the
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probability p, an individual in the spot is cooperator, we have p20 = p2p2 and p11 = 2p(1 − p)p2
where p2 = P{Nc(t) + Nd(t) = 2}. It is straight forward to see, no matter how large the benefit
of cooperation, the evolution condition (4) will fail.
However, there are three typcial strategies for cooperators to achieve the evolution condition (4),
summarized in Figure 3. Using the strategy Stick Together (ST), cooperators stay longer to increase
the chance to interact with cooperators. Thus, the transition rate σ to the state (1, 0) is smaller than
μ in ST. By adopting the strategy Avoid Defector (AD), when a cooperator encounters defectors in
the spot, he will stay shorter than usual to avoid being exploited by defectors. Thus, the transition
rate η to the state (1, 0) from the state (1, 1) is larger than μ. Note that the strategies ST, AD and
their combinations are variants of the well-known strategy tit-for-tat7, in the sense that cooperators
change their behavior (game time in the spot) according to the opponent. The most interesting and
less obvious strategy is Leave Together (LT) (see Figure 4). Since the method used for evaluating
strategies is essentially the same, we focus on the strategy LT. By adopting LT, the pair of coop-
erators acts as a synchronized unit, and they leaves the spot together, although there is a chance
for them to obtain potential benefit remaining in the spot. From the state (2, 0), the process jumps
to the state (0, 0) with the rate μ, skipping the state (1, 0) (see Figure 5). Adopting the strategy
LT, cooperators avoid being alone in the spot, which reduces the chance for defectors to meet and
exploit cooperators. Note that LT has two advantages: (1) thanks to memoryless property of the
exponential distribution15, LT does not affect the marginal distribution (as well as the moments) of
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sojourn time of cooperators in the spot unlike other strategies ST and AD, and (2) the cooperators
can hide the adopted strategy to defectors, since LT works only on cooperators in the state (2, 0).
The strategy LT has the transition diagram shown in Figure 5 and the infinitesimal transition rate
matrixQLT of the Markov chain as
QLT =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−λ pλ (1− λ)λ 0 0 0
μ −μ− λ 0 pλ (1− λ)λ 0
0 0 0 0 pλ (1− λ)λ
μ 0 0 −μ 0 0
0 μ μ 0 −2μ 0
0 0 2μ 0 0 −2μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (7)
The equations are easily solved and the steady state probabilities are found to be
p00 =
{
1 +
μ
pλ
+
(−1 + p)λ
λ + 2μ
}
p10,
p01 =
(1− p)(λ + 2pλ + 2μ)
p(λ + 2μ)
p10,
p20 =
pλ
μ
p10,
p11 =
(1− p)λ(λ + pλ + 2μ)
μ(λ + 2μ)
p10,
p02 =
(1− p)2λ(λ + 2pλ + 2μ)
2pμ (λ + 2μ)
p10,
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where
p10 =
2pλμ(λ + 2μ)
(1 + 2p− p2)λ3 + 4(1 + p)λ2μ + 2(3 + 2p)λμ2 + 4μ3 . (8)
Using these steady state probabilities, we have the sample averages:
E[Cn] =
λ (2bp(λ + 2μ) + c ((−1− 2p + p2)λ− 2(1 + p)μ))
μ ((1 + 2p− p2)λ2 + (3 + 2p)λμ + 2μ2) ,
E[Dn] =
2b(1− p)pλ2(λ + pλ + 2μ)
(1 + 2p− p2)λ3 + 4(1 + p)λ2μ + 2(3 + 2p)λμ2 + 4μ3 . (9)
In Figure 6, we compares E[Cn] and E[Dn] derived in (9) and check the evolution condition (4)
for various parameter settings. By adopting LT, cooperators successfully satisfy the condition (4)
for a sufficiently large cooperation benefits b. It appears that the evolution condition (4) is hard
to satisfy for a small cooperator ratio p, but the stochastic fluctuation due to environment and the
finiteness of generation duration T may be enough for the initial probabilities to exceed this lower
thresholds. In the congested spot such as λ = 10 and 30, the advantage of cooperator in LT is
limited, and the evolution of cooperation may stop at some large p. This even indicates that we
may have a stable mix of cooperators and defectors for highly congested spots.
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Figure 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma game on the cooperation spot. At most two individuals
are allowed in the spot. When there are two, they play Prisoner’s dilemma game for a
random time duration.
Figure 2 The state diagram of Markov chain of (Nc(t), Nd(t)) with no specific strategy.
Cooperators arrive at the rate pλ while defectors arrive at the rate (1− p)λ.
Figure 3 Coopertors’ strategies for evolution of cooperation
Figure 4 Strategy LT: When two cooperators in the spot, they leave the spot together to
avoid being alone in the spot.
Figure 5 The state diagram of Markov chain of Strategy A. Cooperators in the state
(2, 0) will leave the spot simultaneously. Thus, from the state (2, 0), the process jumps to
the state (0, 0), skipping the state (1, 0).
Figure 6 Cooperation evolves in the strategy LT. The light-blue area shows the region
(p, b) where the condition (4) holds. We set the departure rate μ = 1 and the cost of
cooperation c = 1. As the generation goes, the population mix p moves rightward (larger)
in the light-blue area, while in the white area, p moves leftward (smaller). The evolution
of cooperation will emerge for a sufficiently large b. In congested spots, there is a stable
mix of cooperators and defectors. For example, in a congested spot with λ = 30, when
10
b = 10, cooperation emerges from p = 0.2, but stops at around p = 0.8, which becomes
the stable mix.
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⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−λ pλ (1− λ)λ 0 0 0
μ −μ− λ 0 pλ (1− λ)λ 0
0 0 0 0 pλ (1− λ)λ
0 2σ 0 −2σ 0 0
0 μ μ 0 −2μ 0
0 0 2μ 0 0 −2μ
⎞
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⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−λ pλ (1− p)λ 0 0 0
μ −λ− μ 0 pλ (1− p)λ 0
μ 0 −λ− μ 0 pλ (1− p)λ
0 2μ 0 −2μ 0 0
0 η μ 0 −μ− η 0
0 0 2μ 0 0 −2μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
pλ
pλ pλ
(1-p)λ
η
μ
(1-p)λ
μ
(1-p)λ
μ
Nc(t)
Nd(t)
(0,0)
(1,0)
(2,0)
(1,1)
(0,1) (0,2)
2μ
μ
QLT =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−λ pλ (1− λ)λ 0 0 0
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